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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the impact of stock liquidity on firm bankruptcy risk. Using the Securities 
and Exchange Commission decimalization regulation as a shock to stock liquidity, we establish 
that enhanced liquidity decreases default risk. Stocks with the highest default risk experience 
the largest improvements. We find two mechanisms through which stock liquidity reduces firm 
default risk: improving stock price informational efficiency and facilitating corporate 
governance by blockholders. Of the two mechanisms, the informational efficiency channel has 
higher explanatory power than the corporate governance channel. 
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1. Introduction 
     
Default is among the most disruptive events in the life of a corporation. It adversely affects 
productivity through supply chain interruptions and employee attrition, incurs legal and 
administrative costs, and harms customer retention. Default occurs when a firm’s cash flows are 
insufficient to cover its debt service costs and principal payments. Default risk increases when a 
firm’s average cash flow level shifts down or its cash flow volatility increases, or both. A liquid 
market provides investors with the ability to trade stocks quickly and at minimal cost. Can 
liquidity help predict the likelihood of default? Can liquidity affect the risk of default? This paper 
studies the effect of stock liquidity on default risk. 
Stock liquidity can impact default risk for a number of reasons. Increasing liquidity can 
increase default risk if it exacerbates noise trading, leading to greater firm mispricing and higher 
volatility (Baker, Stein, and Wurgler, 2003; Goldstein and Guembel, 2008; Ozdenoren and 
Yuan, 2008; Polk and Sapienza, 2009). Greater liquidity can also decrease internal firm 
monitoring (Bhide, 1993). Alternatively, higher liquidity could decrease default risk by 
improving price efficiency or improving corporate governance through easing investors’ ability 
to exit. Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) provide empirical evidence that liquidity increases firm 
value. Even so, the effect of stock liquidity on default risk is not mechanical as default risk can 
be nonlinear and it depends on several factors other than firm value.  
Understanding the general empirical relation between liquidity and default risk is valuable. 
Liquidity as a predictor variable can help improve models measuring a firm’s default risk. 
Having a real-time publicly observable signal to improve default risk models can lead to better 
contracting and risk management by suppliers, customers, and counterparties.  
To capture default risk, we use the Bharath and Shumway (2008) measure of expected 
default frequency (EDF). The EDF is a simplified version of the Merton (1974) structural 
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distance-to-default model. Researchers could examine bankruptcy events directly, but, as 
bankruptcies are rare, estimation techniques are difficult to implement in practice. Instead, 
models of default likelihood give cross-sectional and time-varying probabilities of default. 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) show that EDF does surprisingly well at forecasting bankruptcies 
out of sample. The measure uses the same inputs as Merton’s distance-to-default model and 
keeps the same functional form, but it forgoes the iterative solution procedure. 
With EDF as our measure of default risk, we evaluate the US equity market between 1994 and 
2014.1 Overall, a negative relation exists between default risk and liquidity. A one standard 
deviation increase in liquidity measured by relative effective spread (Effective Spread) is 
associated with a drop of 26.89% over the sample mean of EDF.  
While we are interested in whether liquidity affects default risk, default risk also could affect 
liquidity. For instance, bid-ask spreads can widen as a firm approaches default and its stock 
becomes more volatile. To overcome reverse causality concerns, we implement a difference-in-
differences (DID) analysis around the 2001 decimalization event. In 2001, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) reduced the minimum tick size from a sixteenth of a dollar to a 
hundredth of a dollar. Prior studies show that decimalization improves market liquidity 
significantly, especially among actively traded stocks (Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000; 
Bessembinder, 2003).  
The effect is large, with EDF decreasing by 6.2% for the treatment group around 
decimalization. Separating stocks into quintiles based on pre-decimalization EDF shows that it 
is stocks with the highest default risk that are most affected. The riskiest quantile experiences a 
decline in EDF of 14.64%.  
We rule out that the effect is mechanical. The event study shows that higher stock liquidity 
decreases default risk. We show that the effect is not mechanical via increased firm value as a 
                                                        
1 The sample starts in 1994 because two of the liquidity measures are computed using Trade and Quote 
(TAQ) data, which starts at 1993, and we lag the liquidity measure for one year in the regression analysis. 
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result of higher liquidity. The liquidity effect is more pronounced among firms experiencing a 
drop in firm value. The impact of an exogenous shock to liquidity on EDF is largest for firms in 
which Ln(Equity) falls or Ln(Debt) increases.  
Finally, we study two channels that could be driving the relation between liquidity and 
default risk: information efficiency and governance. The first channel, higher information 
efficiency, can improve firm performance. Higher liquidity permits informed investors to profit 
more from their private information, thus incentivizing investors to acquire more information 
and trade on it, leading to more informed stock prices (Holden and Subrahmanyam, 1992; 
Holmström and Tirole, 1993; Subrahmanyam and Titman, 2001). Managers learn from stock 
prices and use it to guide corporate investments (Luo, 2005; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; 
Bakke and Whited, 2010). Consequently, managers make better investment decisions, generate 
higher cash flows, and reduce cash flow volatility, resulting in lower default risk. We return to 
examining the decimalization event. We perform the difference-in-differences analysis by 
subtracting the control group values from the treatment group, and we focus on the changes in 
price efficiency after decimalization. Price efficiency is captured using stock return correlation or 
the Hou and Moskowitz (2005) price delay measure. We find that stocks with the largest 
improvement in information efficiency experience the greatest reduction in default risk. 
The second channel we explore is governance. Higher liquidity makes it easier for 
blockholders to sell stocks. Ex ante, the threat of exit can serve as an effective corporate 
governance mechanism (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 
2011). Good corporate governance disciplines managers. It urges them to engage in value-
enhancing investments and guards against opportunistic management behavior, potentially 
leading to lower default probability. Using the same methodology as was used to investigate 
information efficiency, we empirically examine the corporate governance mechanism. We 
capture corporate governance by examining the number of shareholders holding greater than 5% 
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of shares (blockholders) and using the fraction of shares held by these blockholders. Firms with 
a greater increase in governance monitoring have a larger decrease in default risk. 
While the data show that the mechanisms driving the results include improving price 
efficiency and improving blockholder corporate governance, the price efficiency channel has 
higher explanatory power than the corporate governance channel. A one standard deviation 
improvement in price efficiency is associated with about an 11% increase in the standard 
deviation of the change of EDF.  
This paper contributes to the growing literature showing that secondary markets have 
implications for firms; specifically, that liquidity can have real effects (Bond, Edmans, and 
Goldstein, 2012). We show that liquidity can influence default risk. Fang, Noe, and Tice 
(2009) show that stock liquidity improves firm value as measured by Tobin’s q. Bharath, 
Jayaraman, and Nagar (2013) study the role of liquidity in blockholder’s threat of exit and 
conclude that stock liquidity magnifies the effect of block ownership on firm value. Edmans, 
Fang, and Zur (2013) show that greater stock liquidity results in governance shifting from 
blockholder’s voice to the threat of exit. Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) find that an increase in 
liquidity leads to a decrease in firm innovation. Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) show 
that greater stock liquidity can increase shareholder activism.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and variable 
construction. Section 3 presents the general empirical results. Section 4 evaluates causality. 
Section 5 examines the possible mechanisms. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and variable construction 
 
The sample construction starts with a comprehensive list of US common stocks between 1993 
and 2013, which appears in both the Compustat Industrial files and the Center for Research in 
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Security Prices (CRSP) stock file.2 We obtain intraday trades and quotes from the Trade and 
Quote (TAQ) database to construct the high-frequency liquidity measure. We exclude from our 
sample financial firms [standard industrial classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999] 
because their accounting numbers are subject to statutory capital requirements. To ensure there 
are enough data points to compute liquidity measures, we exclude firm-year observations with 
lower than two hundred active trading days in a year. The accounting data are obtained from the 
CRSP and Compustat merged quarterly database. If the accounting information is missing for 
one year, the previous non-missing observation is used. The final sample contains 7,128 firms 
and 51,527 firm-year observations. All variable definitions are in Table 1. 
We capture stock liquidity using both high-frequency and low-frequency measures. We 
consider two spread measures calculated using data from the TAQ database. Compared with 
variables based on daily data, high-frequency measures provide a better and more precise 
measure of trading cost (Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009). Our main liquidity measure is 
relative effective spread (Effective Spread), which captures the cost of a round-trip trade. The 
relative effective spread is defined as twice the difference between the execution price and the 
midpoint of the prevailing best quotes divided by the midpoint of the prevailing best bid-ask 
quote. We multiply the value by one hundred so the variable is in percentages. 
We apply several filters to the TAQ data before computing the effective spread measures. We 
follow Hasbrouck (2010) to derive the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) and then match each 
trade to a prevailing national best bid-ask quote.3 Following Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2001), we exclude records for which the bid-ask spread is larger than $5, the dollar effective 
spread is more than four times larger than the dollar quoted spread, the relative effective spread 
                                                        
2 The sample begins in 1993 as this is when the TAQ database begins. The sample period for EDF is 
from 1994 to 2014. 
3 The SAS program suggested by Hasbrouck (2010) can be found on the Wharton Research Data 
Service website (https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/). Following Lee and Ready (1991), each 
trade from 1993 through 1998 is matched to the first quote that is at least five seconds prior to that trade. 
After 1998, the matching quote is the first quote prior to the trade. 
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is four times larger than the relative quoted spread, and the bid-ask spread is more than 40% of 
the trade price. We classify trades into buyer-initiated and seller-initiated using the Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm. 
The daily relative effective spread is the equal-weighted average of all intraday effective 
spread records. We then average across all trading days in a year to compute Effective Spread. A 
high spread implies low liquidity. 
The second liquidity measure is percentage quoted spread (Quoted Spread), defined as the 
difference between the national best ask and bid price divided by the midpoint of the best bid 
and ask price. The value is multiplied by one hundred so the variable is in percentages. We first 
compute the daily equal-weighted average of all intraday relative quoted spread and then 
average across all trading days in a year to obtain Quoted Spread.  
Our first low-frequency measure is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio, Amihud, defined as 
the absolute value of daily stock return divided by daily dollar trading volume, multiplied by one 
million. The measure captures the idea that, for a given amount of trading, illiquid stocks should 
experience a larger change in price. A higher Amihud value corresponds to lower liquidity. 
Following Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999), the measure Zeros is defined as the 
proportion of days with zero returns, multiplied by one hundred. Illiquid stocks are more likely 
to experience trading days with zero returns due to either no trading interest or high trading 
cost. A higher Zeros value represents lower liquidity.  
We construct a measure of expected default frequency as in Bharath and Shumway (2008), 
which is a simplified version of the Merton (1974) structural distance-to-default model. Merton 
(1974) considers a firm’s equity a call option on the underlying value of the firm’s assets with a 
strike price equal to the face value of the firm’s debt, and a firm defaults when its asset value 
falls below the face value of the firm’s debt. The model calculates a distant-to-default (DD) 
measure. The resulting DD measure is then substituted into a cumulative standard normal 
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distribution to compute the probability that the value of a firm’s assets will be less than the face 
value of its debt.  
While the Merton model has been widely used in academic studies and by practitioners 
(Kealhofer and Kurbat, 2001; Crosbie and Bohn, 2003; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Duffie, Saita, 
and Wang, 2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008) argue that the Merton model’s predictive 
power mainly comes from its functional form, not the actual default probability produced by the 
model. Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) reach a similar conclusion. Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) further propose a naïve default probability measure that retains the Merton 
model’s structural form and same basic inputs while simplifying the calculation. They show that 
the naïve measure performs well. We follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) to compute EDF as 
follows: 
 
𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑙𝑜𝑔(
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
)+(𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1−
𝜎𝑉𝑖,𝑡
2
2
)×𝑇𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑉𝑖,𝑡×√𝑇𝑖,𝑡
,                                                                                                   (1) 
𝜎𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
×𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖,𝑡
×(0.05 + 0.25×𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡)                                                  (2) 
and 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁(−𝐷𝐷𝑖,𝑡),                                                                                                                                       (3) 
  
where Equityi,t is the market value of equity (in millions of dollars) calculated as the product of 
the number of shares outstanding and stock price at the end of the year; Debti,t is the face value 
of debt computed as the sum of debt in current liabilities (Compustat quarterly data #45) and 
one-half of long-term debt (Compustat quarterly data #51) at the end of the year; rit-1, firm i’s 
past annual return, is calculated from monthly stock returns over the previous year; 𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the 
stock return volatility for firm i during year t estimated using the monthly stock return from the 
previous year; σVi,t, calculated from σEi,t, is an approximation of the volatility of firm assets; and 
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Ti,t is set to one year. We construct DDi,t of all sample firms as of the last day of each year. N(.) is 
the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
We use the same control variables as in Bharath and Shumway (2008). Ln(Equity) is the 
natural log of market value of equity at the end of the year. Ln(Debt) is the natural log of face 
value of debt. 1/σE is the inverse of the annualized stock return volatility. Excess Return is the 
difference between the stock’s annual return and the CRSP value-weighted return. We follow 
Bharath and Shumway (2008) to calculate the excess return using market return as the 
benchmark given our focus on the part of the return that is not explained by the overall market 
return.4 Income/Assets is the ratio of net income to total asset. We winsorize all variables, 
except EDF, at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influences of outliers. Table 2 reports 
summary statistics, including the mean, minimum, median, maximum, and standard deviation, 
for the entire sample. Panel A reports the variables used for the full sample. Panel B reports only 
the variables used for the mechanism analysis in Section 5.  
For the full period, the summary statistics show the range of our sample. An average firm in 
our sample has an expected default frequency (EDF) of 6.19%. The default rate is highly skewed 
to the right. While the median is zero, the maximum is a full 100%.5 The standard deviation of 
EDF is large at 18.9%. Liquidity measured by Effective Spread (Quoted Spread) ranges from 
0.03% (0.03%) to 6.76% (5.22%) with a mean value of 1.00% (1.21%), consistent with existing 
literature. The Amihud measure (multiplied by 106) averages 0.42, and the mean of Zeros is 
6.82%. 
The other firm variables look relatively standard and also have a reasonable degree of 
variation.6 For instance, the average market value of equity, Equity, is $3.1 billion and ranges 
                                                        
4 We repeat the analysis with raw returns and the results are qualitatively the same. 
5 We winsorize the distance-to-default (DD) variable, but we do not winsorize EDF because the value of 
EDF is bounded. If we winsorize EDF, the maximum value of EDF becomes 97.54%. 
6 The statistics in the table are reported after winsorization, which is why the minimum and maximum 
are denser than the population. For instance, we report the minimum Debt to be $30,000 as values of 
zero will be replaced. This also explains why the maximum Equity value is $63 billion.  
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from $23 million to $63 billion. The average face value of debt is $515 million, and the average 
Excess Return is slightly over 5%. Average return volatility of the stocks in our sample is 51.12%. 
The average Income/Assets is -0.0076. 
 
3. Panel analysis 
  
Before turning to causal interpretations, we examine the general relation between liquidity 
and default risk. Understanding the empirical relation between liquidity and default risk 
provides useful insights itself. If, for instance, liquidity can help predict default, then suppliers, 
customers, and counterparties can use it to improve their contracting and risk management. We 
begin with simple distributions of EDFs across liquidity groups. All four measures show a 
negative relation between liquidity and default risk. As other factors that are likely correlated 
with liquidity and default risk could be driving the relation, we move to multivariate regressions. 
Even so, the negative relation persists. We show the relation is true for most industries and is 
robust to different measures of liquidity.  
 
3.1.  Univariate analysis 
 
We form portfolios by sorting stocks by their level of liquidity. In each year t, stocks are 
assigned into one of five groups based on their liquidity measure. We compute the portfolio EDF 
in year t+1 by taking the average of the EDF across all stocks in the portfolio. Table 3 reports 
summary statistics for the EDF across liquidity-sorted portfolios.  
EDF declines monotonically with stock liquidity. Firms in the liquid portfolios have lower 
expected default frequency. The results hold for all four measures of liquidity and are 
economically large. The 5-1 measure row reports the average EDF difference between the least 
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liquid and most liquid stock. The least liquid firms, those in the bottom quintile, are 9.21% 
(Zeros) to 11.09% (Effective Spread) more likely to default in the following year compared with 
the most liquid quintile of stocks. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
These results establish a negative relation between stock liquidity and default risk at the 
univariate level. However, some of the difference in default risk could be due to other firm 
characteristics. For instance, small firms can be riskier and have a higher default risk. These 
small firms are also more likely to have low stock liquidity due to greater information 
asymmetry.  
 
3.2. Multivariate analyses 
 
We extend the analysis to a multivariate setting. Bharath and Shumway (2008) argue that the 
functional form of the EDF is important to capturing default risk, above and beyond the default 
risk’s input variables. To control for the direct determinants of default risk, we follow Bharath 
and Shumway (2008) to include five control variables: Ln(Equity), Ln(Debt), 1/σE, Excess 
Return, and Income/Asset. We lag all independent variables by one year to mitigate the issue of 
reverse causality.7 Standard errors are clustered by firm.8 The baseline specification is defined as: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐿𝑛(𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑛(𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾3 1 𝜎𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1⁄ +
𝛾4𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾5 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠⁄ 𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜃
′𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 + 𝜓
′𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 ,                                                                                                                                                           (4) 
 
where Liquidity is either Effective Spread, Quoted Spread, Amihud, or Zeros measured for firm 
i in year t-1. Firm and Year stand for vectors of firm and year fixed effects. 
                                                        
7 The results hold if we perform contemporaneous regressions.  
8 The statistical significance is similar if we cluster standard errors by industry, by year or by both. 
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Table 4 presents the results from the EDF regression analysis with firm and year fixed effects. 
Column 1 presents the results of the regression without a liquidity measure. Columns 2 to 5 
report the results of regressions with Effective Spread, Quoted Spread, Amihud, and Zeros as 
liquidity measures, respectively. The negative relation between firm default risk and stock 
liquidity holds in the regression analysis. The results are consistent across all four measures of 
liquidity. The point estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. The sizes of the 
coefficients are also economically important.  
For instance, the coefficient on Effective Spread is 0.0135. A 1% decrease in the effective 
spread (increase in liquidity) is associated with a 1.35% decrease in default risk. To account for 
the variability of the Effective Spread, we can calculate the normalized coefficient by taking the 
product of the Effective Spread in Table 4 and the standard deviation of Effective Spread 
reported in Table 2, Panel A. The interpretation is that a one standard deviation decrease in 
Effective Spread is associated with a 1.66% (0.0135 × 1.2330) level drop in default probability, 
equivalent to a drop of 26.89% over the sample mean of EDF (i.e., 6.19%). Likewise, when there 
is a one standard deviation decrease in Amihud, the expected decline in EDF is 1.01% (0.0072 × 
1.4088), equivalent to a drop in the default probability of 16.39% relative to the sample average. 
For Zeros, the expected drop in default rate caused by a one standard deviation decrease in days 
with zero stock returns is 1.19% (0.0016 × 7.4337), which is equal to a drop of 19.22% over the 
sample’s average EDF.9 
The results from the multivariate regression analysis support the univariate results in 
Subsection 3.1. The negative relation between liquidity and default risk persists even after 
controlling for firm characteristics known to be associated with default risk. 
                                                        
9 In Internet Appendix Section A.1, we analyze the relation between actual bankruptcies and liquidity 
using a Cox proportional hazard rate model. We show that the negative relation also exists when 
evaluating actual bankruptcies. 
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One potential concern is that the relation shown in Table 4, Panel A, is driven by one or a 
handful of industries. For instance, given the large number of bankruptcies following the dot-
com bubble, our results could be limited to high-tech firms. To address this issue, we estimate 
the EDF regression separately for each of the Fama and French 12 industries. As we exclude 
financial firms, there are only 11 industries in the sample. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the results. Each row represents a regression conducted for a 
particular industry subset of firms. For instance, Row 1 is based on firms in the nondurables 
industry. For each industry, we perform four regressions, one for each of the liquidity measures. 
For brevity, we report only the coefficient and standard error, clustered by firm, for the liquidity 
variable from the regression. Not every coefficient is statistically significant, but, overall, the 
negative relation between liquidity and default risk holds across industries. For Quoted Spread, 
it is statistically significant for all 11 industries. For Effective Spread (Amihud and Zeros), ten 
(six and five) of the 11 industries show a statistically significant coefficient. The effects of 
liquidity on default risk are not purely driven by high-tech industries. They can also be found 
across the economy. 
 
4. Exogeneity 
 
Section 3 shows a relation between liquidity and default risk. However, multivariate analysis 
does not address the potential reverse causality problem. Empirically, identifying whether 
higher stock liquidity leads to lower default risk is difficult because the relation goes both ways. 
Liquidity could affect default risk, but default risk could also affect liquidity. Market makers 
demand higher returns for making markets in riskier assets by quoting wider spreads (Copeland 
and Galai, 1983). That is, market makers provide less liquidity in stocks with higher default risk. 
Even lagging independent variables is not sufficient to overcome the reverse causality problem. 
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The identification strategy we implement to address the issue is the use of tick price 
decimalization as an exogenous shock to stock liquidity. We also conduct several tests, including 
difference-in-differences tests to identify the effect of liquidity on default probability in the 
following session. 
Decimalization refers to the transition to quoting and trading securities in one penny 
increments from 1/16 of a dollar in 2001. Prior to decimalization, the smallest price change for 
stock trading was 1/16 of one dollar in a price quote. The SEC regulated that all stock markets 
within the US should convert all stock price quotes to decimal trading by April 9, 2001. With the 
implementation of decimalization, the minimum price change is $0.01, which allows for tighter 
spreads between bid and ask prices. 
Decimalization is widely used in prior literature as an exogenous positive shock to stock 
market liquidity (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009; Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar, 2013; Edmans, 
Fang, and Zur, 2013; Kang and Kim, 2013). It is a good candidate for an exogenous shock to 
liquidity for three reasons. First, the event is unlikely to be driven by firm default risk. Instead, 
the change was prompted by the SEC’s effort to reduce security trading cost, encourage quote 
competition, and boost the US equity market’s competitive edge relative to foreign markets.10 
Second, stock liquidity improved significantly after decimalization, especially among actively 
traded stocks (Bessembinder, 2003; Furfine, 2003; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2008). 
Third, large cross-sectional variation exists in the change in liquidity, allowing us to implement 
                                                        
10 In the 1994 SEC report Market 2000: an examination of current equity market developments, the 
agency Staff expressed concern that 1/8th of a dollar tick size could “cause artificially wide spreads and 
hinder quote competition.” The report also expressed concern that the 1/8th fraction pricing could hurt 
“the competitive posture of the US equity markets” compared with foreign equity markets. In March 1997, 
Rep. Michael Oxley introduced a bill in the US House of Representatives that would have directed the SEC 
to adopt decimal pricing for all equity securities. In September 2000, the SEC further mandated that the 
exchanges start implementing decimal pricing and finish implementation by April 2001. NYSE and Amex 
would replace the system of fractional pricing by January 29, 2001. Nasdaq decimalized shortly thereafter 
and finished implementing it by April 2001. 
15 
 
 
 
a difference-in-differences analysis to test whether a larger increase in liquidity is associated 
with a greater decline in default risk.  
We focus on the year before and the year after decimalization. A short window reduces 
concerns relating to reverse causality and allows us to better control for the impact of 
unobserved variables as significant changes in those variables are less likely to happen during 
a short window. 
To make claims about how liquidity affects default risk, we employ a DID identification 
strategy. We compare the change in the default probability for two groups of firms that look 
similar except that they experience a significantly different change in liquidity around 
decimalization. The DID method controls for the impact of omitted and unobserved variables, 
and it removes biases driven by time trends.  
We follow Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) to construct a treatment group and a control group 
using propensity score matching. We rank all sample firms based on their changes in liquidity 
around decimalization and assign them into terciles. We retain firms in the first and third 
tercile. From here onward in this paper, we focus on the relative effective spread, Effective 
Spread. 
We estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is set to one for firms in the first 
tercile and zero for firms in the third tercile, and we use the predicted probabilities (propensity 
scores) to match firms in the two groups. The probit model includes Effective Spread and the 
same set of control variables as in Eq. (4), measured in the pre-decimalization year (2000). Each 
firm in the first tercile is matched to a firm in the third tercile with the closest propensity score 
and with a propensity score match within 0.01. We retain all pairs in the case of multiple 
matching. This approach yields a treatment group and a matching control group with firms 
having very similar firm characteristics and liquidity prior to decimalization but experiencing a 
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different degree of change in liquidity after decimalization. The treatment (control) group 
consists of firms with the highest (lowest) increase in stock liquidity decimalization. 
The matching procedure produces seven hundred treatment-control pairs.11 The results of the 
probit regression are reported in Table 5, Panel A, Column 1. The probit model produces 
a pseudo R-squared of 0.1068 and a p-value from the chi-square test below 0.0001, suggesting 
that the model specification captures a significant amount of variation in the choice variable. 
The validity of the DID estimator critically depends on the assumption that the underlying 
trends in the outcome variable is the same for both groups (parallel trend assumption). We 
follow Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014) and perform three diagnostic tests to verify that the 
assumption holds in this case.  
The first diagnose test reruns the probit model reported in Table 5, Panel A, Column 1, except 
for the matched sample. The results are in Column 2. All of the explanatory variables are 
insignificant, and the likelihood ratio is lower than pre-match probit model results in Column 1. 
The interpretation is that no observable different characteristics exist between the treatment 
and control groups in the pre-decimalization year. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates in 
the post-match analysis are smaller, and no longer statistically significant, compared with that 
of the coefficients in the pre-match analysis, suggesting a weaker relation between firm 
characteristic differentials of the treatment and control groups. In addition, the pseudo R-
squared drops drastically from 0.1068 prior to the matching to 0.0016. The chi-square test has a 
p-value of 0.9556 on the pre-match probit model, suggesting that, overall, all coefficient 
estimates on independent variables are not statistically significantly different from zero.  
The analysis in Table 5, Panel A, Column 2, dampens the concern that the less-affected 
control group is not fundamentally different from the more-affected treatment group. However, 
an omitted variable could be correlated with both how decimalization affects different stocks 
                                                        
11 The number of matched pairs is larger than that in Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014), because fewer firms 
have missing data for EDF than for innovation variables. 
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and EDF. Therefore, complete exogeneity is challenging to establish. In the ideal setting, a group 
of stocks not subject to the tick size change could be used as a control group. Prior to the 2001 
decimalization, a short pilot program had a staggered introduction and so created a natural 
unaffected control group. While the time period is short, we show in the Internet Appendix that 
the main results in this paper hold in the pilot program.  
The second test compares the propensity scores of the treatment and control groups. Table 5, 
Panel B, reports the distribution of the propensity scores for both groups and their difference. 
The two groups’ propensity scores line up closely. The average distance between the treatment 
firms’ and matching control firms’ propensity score is less than -0.0001, with a maximum 
(minimum) of 0 (-0.0092).  
The last diagnostic test performs a t-test on the differences between the two groups’ pre- 
decimalization characteristics. Panel C of Table 5 shows no statistically significant differences 
between the treatment group and the control group of firms’ characteristics that affect firm’s 
EDF. Moreover, the two groups have a similar level of liquidity prior to decimalization, even if 
the decimalization affects them differently. The diagnostic tests suggest that the propensity 
score matching method is able to dampen the potentially confounding firm differences known to 
affect default risk, helping to alleviate concerns that the results are not driven by general time 
trends. 
Panel D of Table 5 shows that significant differences in EDF exist between the treatment and 
control firms after decimalization. We calculate the DID estimator and corresponding t-statistics 
and report the results in Table 5, Panel E. We calculate the change of EDF from the pre-
decimalization year to the post-decimalization year (∆EDF) for both the treatment and the 
control firms. We next examine the difference in ∆EDF between the two groups. On average, a 
treatment group firm experiences a larger decline in default risk by 8.97% compared with a 
control group firm. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.   
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Finally, we perform the DID analysis in a regression framework as follows: 
 
𝐸𝐷𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡,        (5) 
 
where Treatment is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) if a stock is part of the treatment 
(control) group, After is a dummy variable equal to one for 2002 (post-decimalization year) and 
zero for 2000, and Treatment*After is the interaction between these two variables.  
The control variables are the same as those used in the probit model in Table 5, Panel A, 
measured in the pre-decimalization year. In addition, we explicitly control for any firm value 
changes surrounding decimalization (Fang, Noe, and Tice, 2009). We include in the regression 
specification the change of Tobin’s q from pre-decimalization to post-decimalization interacted 
with the After indicator variable. As the change in Tobin’s q is realized only post-decimalization, 
we interact it with the After indicator so the variable can impact only the post-decimalization 
observations. Any differential change in liquidity due to an increase in Tobin’s q should be 
captured by Tobin’s q. Standard errors are clustered by firm. The Column 2 specification 
includes industry fixed effects.  
The results are in Table 5, Panel F. The statistical significant and negative coefficients of -
0.062 for Treatment*After indicates that the treatment firms experience a larger drop of 6.2% 
in EDF after the decimalization compared with the control group. The results consistently show 
that an increase in liquidity lowers EDF. 12 
                                                        
12  One could be concerned that improved liquidity increases the stock price, so liquidity will 
mechanically increase as the Effective Spread measure has stock price in the denominator. While such an 
effect would be small, to ensure that it does not drive the results we repeat the analyses in Table 5, Panel 
F, for the subgroup of stocks in which the stock price does not rise post-decimalization. The results are 
qualitatively the same and keep their statistical significance.  
In the Internet Appendix, we report two robustness tests of the main result. In Subsection A2.1, we 
implement a difference-in-differences analysis around a 2000 decimalization pilot program. In 
Subsection A2.2, we conduct the difference-in-differences analysis around the 1997 tick size reduction 
from 8ths to 16ths. Both alternative approaches result in qualitatively similar findings as seen in Table 5, 
Panel F. 
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If stock liquidity can reduce the risk of default, the effect should be largest as a firm nears 
default. To test this conjecture, we divide the matched sample into four groups based on the size 
of the pre-decimalization EDF and run the DID regression from Eq. (5) for each group 
separately.  Table 6 reports the results. Column 1 reports the analysis conducted on firms with 
the highest EDF in 2000, and the results in Column 4 come from firms with the lowest EDF in 
2000. The statistical significance and magnitude of coefficients on Treatment*After declines 
monotonically from the group with the highest EDF to the group with the lowest EDF. The 
coefficient for the highest EDF firm group is -0.1464 and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. For the second group, the coefficient magnitude falls to -0.0976 and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The third group coefficient magnitude falls further to -0.0539 but 
remains statistically significant at the 1% level. For the lowest EDF group, the coefficient 
magnitude drops further, to -0.0345. The evidence supports the conjecture that the effect of 
stock liquidity on default risk is more pronounced for firms with higher pre-decimalization EDF. 
 
5. Possible mechanisms 
 
In this section, we investigate possible explanations for why liquidity can reduce default risk. 
We first provide further evidence that the linkage is not mechanical. Thereafter, we explore two 
possible channels through which stock liquidity affects firm default risk: information efficiency 
and governance. We find evidence that both channels work. We show, in a horse race that the 
informational efficiency channel plays a larger role. 
 
5.1.  Is the relation between liquidity and default risk mechanical? 
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Default occurs when a firm is unable to meet its debt obligations or when its asset value falls 
below the debt value. Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) provide evidence that, compared with their 
low liquidity counterparties, firms with liquid stocks tend to have higher firm value, leading to 
lower likelihood of bankruptcy. The negative relation between liquidity and default probability 
could simply be a direct result of the firm value effect. To address a mechanical relation between 
firm value increasing and, therefore, default risk decreasing, we already include as a control 
variable in the Eq. (5) specification the change in Tobin’s q.  
To more closely examine the role of firm value in our results, we re-estimate the DID 
regression in Eq. (5) for subsamples of firms with different changes in firm value around 
decimalization. We divide the matched sample into two subsamples based on the direction of 
the change of equity value or debt value around decimalization. If the low default risk is 
mechanically driven by higher firm value, we expect to see the relation more pronounced among 
firms with positive (negative) change in equity (debt) value. The results are reported in Table 7. 
Column 1 includes only the matched sample of firms with a zero or negative change of 
Ln(Equity). In Column 2 the sample includes only firms with positive change of Ln(Equity). The 
coefficient on Treatment*After is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in Column 
1, and it is statistically insignificant in Column 2. We calculate a Z-statistic to formally test 
whether the coefficient on Treatment*After is different between the analysis in Column 1 and 2. 
The Z-statistic shows that the two coefficients are statistically significantly different from each 
other. The differential coefficient indicates that the effect of liquidity on EDF is more 
pronounced for firms with negative change of equity value. This is counter to the direct effect 
suggesting that the effect should be larger when Ln(Equity) increases.  
Column 3 presents the DID regression results for the subsample with a non-negative change 
in Ln(Debt), and Column 4 is for firms with negative change in Ln(Debt). The coefficient on 
Treatment*After is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level in Column 3, and 
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statistically insignificant in Column 4, suggesting that the effect of stock liquidity on EDF is 
larger for firms with increasing Ln(Debt). The results further indicate that the effect of liquidity 
on EDF is not through firm value, i.e., the relation between liquidity and EDF is not 
mechanical.13 
 
5.2. Informational efficiency 
 
Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) argue that higher liquidity enhances the informational 
efficiency of stock prices by inducing more informed trading. Although managers are most 
informed of their own firms’ fundamentals and investment opportunities, outside investors can 
possess better information on other price-relevant factors, such as the macroeconomic and 
industry outlook and competitors’ strategies, which is transmitted into stock prices through 
their trading. Managers tend to listen to the information from the financial market because it is 
accessible and cheap (Dow and Gorton, 1997). As a result, managers use the information in 
stock prices to guide their decision making and investments (Luo, 2005; Chen, Goldstein, and 
Jiang, 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010), which, in turn, affects a firm’s future cash flow and its 
ability to meet its debt obligation. 
We employ two measures to capture price efficiency. The first measure is stock return 
autocorrelation (Correlation), the absolute value of the first-order return autocorrelation of 
weekly returns. A smaller autocorrelation indicates that the stock price process is closer to a 
random walk and, thus, the price is more efficient. The second measure is a price delay measure 
(Hou and Moskowitz, 2005), which captures the average delay with the stock price movements 
                                                        
13 In unreported results, we do the analysis for two inputs of EDF, Return and σE. For the Return input, 
the largest magnitude decrease is associated with a positive change of stock return as the direct static 
effect would suggest. For σE, the coefficient on Treatment*After is statistically significant only for firms 
with increasing σE, which is associated with the opposite effect expected from the positive relation 
between σE and EDF.  The results suggest that the relation between liquidity and EDF is complex and that 
the effect of liquidity on any one input variable does not mechanically determine the overall effect. 
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in response to information. Price Delay is calculated as 1-(R-squared of restricted model / R-
squared of nonrestricted model). The nonrestricted model is specified as𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 +
∑ 𝛿𝑖
(−𝑛)
𝑅𝑚,𝑡−𝑛
4
𝑛=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where ri,t is the return on stock i in week t and Rm,t is the return on the 
CRSP value-weighted market index in week t. The restricted model constrains that 𝛿𝑖
(−𝑛)
 = 0. We 
compute the price efficiency measures for each stock for the pre- and post-decimalization year 
and take the difference to obtain the change in the price efficiency measure from pre-
decimalization year to post-decimalization year (∆Correlation and ∆Price Delay). Table 8, Panel 
A, reports the statistics and the corresponding t-statistics.  
Compared with the control firms, after decimalization, firms in the treatment group 
experience a statistically significant larger drop of 2.92% and 6.25% in Correlation and Price 
Delay, respectively. The results are consistent with firms experiencing an increase in price 
efficiency due to higher liquidity decreasing default risk. 
In the regression specification, we regress ∆EDF on the change in a price efficiency measure 
and the change of control variables for the matched sample constructed in Table 5.14 The change 
is from pre-decimalization year (2000) to post-decimalization year (2002) for each firm. The 
control variables are the same as used throughout the paper: changes in Ln(Equity), Ln(Debt), 
1/σE, Excess Return, Income/Assets, and Tobin’s q. The results are shown in Table 8, Panel B. 
Column 1 reports ∆Correlation and Column 2 reports ∆Price Delay.  
The coefficient of interest, the change in the price efficiency measure, is statistically 
significant and positive for each specification. An improvement in price efficiency is associated 
with a decline in EDF. For example, the coefficient on ∆Correlation is 0.2088. A firm in the 
treatment group that experiences a larger decline of 0.0292 in Correlation surrounding the 
decimalization event translates into a further reduction of EDF by 0.61% (0.2088 × 0.0292) 
                                                        
14 As the regression is now performed on changes, we no longer need to interact ∆Tobin’s q with the 
After indicator. 
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compared with firms in the control group. 15 The magnitude varies across the two price efficiency 
measures, but all suggest that the informational efficiency of price is a channel through which 
stock liquidity affects firm’s default risk. 
 
5.3. Corporate governance 
 
Another possible channel through which stock liquidity reduces default risk is corporate 
governance. Maug (1998) models the incentives of monitoring by large shareholders. He argues 
that liquidity makes corporate governance more effective if monitoring is costly. Admati and 
Pfleiderer (2009) also analyze the threat of exit as an alternative mechanism of corporate 
governance. Their results support the notion that liquidity could enhance governance. Edmans 
and Manso (2011) show that liquidity increases blockholders’ effectiveness in exerting corporate 
governance through disciplinary trading, which, as a result, induces a higher managerial effort. 
Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) show the causal effect of liquidity on improving corporate 
governance using decimalization as an exogenous shock. They find that liquidity facilitates block 
formation and encourages governing via trading (exit), although liquidity weakens blockholders’ 
incentives for active intervention (voice). The overall effect is positive. 
We employ two measures to capture governance, blockholder ownership (Block) and the 
number of blockholders (NBlock), using institutional ownership data from the Thomson Reuters 
Institutional (13F) Holdings database at Wharton Research Data Service. Block is calculated as 
the total holding by institutional blockholders who own no less than 5% of the shares 
outstanding at the end of each year, and NBlock is the number of the blockholders (Larcker, 
Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).  
                                                        
15 Multiply the coefficient on ∆Correlation by the difference-in-differences estimator of ∆Correlation. 
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Similar to the analysis in Subsection 5.2, we first show that the shock to liquidity brought by 
decimalization is associated with more block holding in terms of the number of blockholders 
and their total holding. ∆Block is defined as the difference in total block holding between the 
pre-event and the post-event period. ∆NBlock is defined in similar manner. Table 9, Panel A, 
shows the difference-in-differences estimators for both ∆Block and ∆NBlock.  
Blockholders as a group increase their holdings in treatment firms from 16.56% to 17.93% of 
shares outstanding following the change to trading in decimalization, compared with a change 
from 16.03% to 14.26% for control firms. The DID estimator is 3.14 percentage points, 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Results are qualitatively similar for the number of 
blockholders. The number blockholders in the treatment stocks increases by 0.34 more 
compared with the control stocks, with a p-value less than 0.0001. Taken together, these results 
suggest that an improvement in liquidity attracts more blockholders and results in a subsequent 
increase in their aggregate ownership.  
We next regress ∆EDF on the change in the blockholding measure and the change of control 
variables. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 9. Column 1 includes Block, and Column 2 
includes NBlock. The coefficient of the change in Block (NBlock) is -0.1617 (-0.0079), suggesting 
that, compared with the control firms, an average firm in the treatment group that experiences a 
larger increase of 3.14% (34%) in Block (NBlock) surrounding the decimalization can lead to a 
further reduction of EDF by 0.51% (0.27%).16 The treatment stocks experience an additional 
drop in EDF of 0.51% due to increased blockholding, which is equivalent to a decline of 3.08% 
over their pre-decimalization mean. Results for the number of blockholders are similar in terms 
of sign and the magnitude of the effects. The results show that improved corporate governance is 
a channel through which stock liquidity affects firm’s default risk. 
                                                        
16 Multiply the coefficient on ∆Block (∆NBlock) by the difference-in-differences estimator of ∆Block 
(∆NBlock), -0.1617 × 0.0314 (-0.0079 × 0.34). 
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One concern regarding the governance channel is that the effective spread is not directly 
relevant to block formation and blockholder trading. To address this issue, we repeat the 
analysis by replacing the effective spread with a price impact measure.17 Price impact is a 
measure of liquidity that focuses on how a trade (buy or sell) affects the subsequent price change. 
It reflects the cost faced by traders, making it a relevant measure for large traders such as 
blockholders. We follow Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) to calculate the price impact 
component of the relative effective spread.18 We first construct the matched sample based on the 
change of Price Impact surrounding the decimalization and then show that the shock to price 
impact brought by decimalization is associated with more block holding. The results in Table 9, 
Panels C and D, still support the corporate governance channel. 
 
5.4. Comparing mechanisms 
 
While the data show that both increasing price efficiency and improving corporate 
governance drive the results, it is unclear which mechanism is more important. We compare the 
two mechanisms through a horse race. We include measures for the two mechanisms in one 
regression specification. As there are different measures for each mechanism and these 
measures have divergent magnitudes, we use different combinations of the measures and 
implement a standardized regression. We subtract the dependent variable and all independent 
variables by their mean value and divide the difference by their standard deviation. For instance, 
we standardize ΔEDF by subtracting its mean value and dividing the difference by the standard 
deviation of ΔEDF. The interpretation of a coefficient is the impact a one standard deviation 
change in the independent variable has on the dependent variable, in terms of a standard 
deviation variation.  
                                                        
17 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the idea. 
18 See Table 1 for the calculation of Price Impact. 
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We again use the matched sample constructed in Table 5 and regress the standardized ∆EDF 
(labeled as ∆EDF STD) on the standardized change of mechanism variables (∆Correlation STD, 
∆Price Delay STD, ∆Block STD, ∆NBlock STD) and the standardized change of control variables 
[∆Ln(Equity) STD, ∆Ln(Debt) STD, ∆(1/σE) STD, ∆Excess Return STD, ∆Income/Assets STD, 
and ∆Tobin’s q]. The results are reported in Table 10.  
The table has four columns, one for each of the possible combinations of the mechanism-
based variables. In Columns 1 and 2, we use ∆Correlation STD as the price efficiency measure 
but two different blockholding measures, ∆Block STD and ∆NBlock STD, respectively. 
Comparing the first two columns, the coefficients on ∆Correlation STD are almost the same 
(11%), and the coefficients on ∆NBlock STD and ∆Block STD are smaller in magnitude. Columns 
3 and 4 contain ∆Price Delay STD as the price efficiency measure and ∆Block STD and ∆NBlock 
STD as the blockholding measure, respectively. The variable capturing price efficiency, ∆Price 
Delay STD, has the largest effect, with a coefficient of about 0.12. The coefficient of ∆Block STD 
(0.08) is statistically significant and larger in magnitude than the coefficient of ∆Nblock STD. 
By comparing the results vertically in each column, we find that the price efficiency channel 
has higher explanatory power than the corporate governance channel. One standard deviation 
increase in ∆Correlation (∆Price Delay) can lead to about an 11% (12%) increase in the standard 
deviation of ∆EDF. The coefficients on ∆Block STD (∆NBlock STD) are lower in magnitude than 
the coefficients on all the standardized change of price efficiency measures, suggesting that the 
explanatory power of the blockholders’ governance channel is lower than that of the price 
efficiency channel. 
 
6. Conclusion 
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This study examines whether and how stock liquidity affects firm default risk, as measured by 
expected default frequency. We show a strong negative relation between stock liquidity and firm 
bankruptcy risk. The relation is robust across multiple liquidity measures. To overcome reverse 
causality concerns, we use the decimalization event of 2001 as an exogenous shock to stock 
liquidity and employ a difference-in-differences analysis to show a negative effect of stock 
liquidity on firm default risk. The results consistently show that increasing stock liquidity 
decreases firm default risk. Moreover, the relation appears nonlinear. The impact is higher for 
firms with greater default risk in the pre-decimalization period. 
The paper further explores the underlying mechanism through which stock liquidity affects 
default risk. We provide support that increased price efficiency and improved corporate 
governance are the two channels. A horse race between the mechanisms shows that the 
informational efficiency channel is more important than the governance channel. 
Prior work shows a positive link between liquidity and firm value. Firms with higher firm 
value are less likely to miss their debt obligation, leading to a concern that the negative relation 
between liquidity and default probability is mechanical via increased firm value. We show that, 
even after controlling for the firm value channel, increasing stock liquidity reduces default risk. 
Default is costly for the firm, its investors, and the real economy. Market structures that can 
decrease its likelihood are valuable and should be considered by regulators. This paper shows 
that decreasing the minimum tick size, i.e., increasing liquidity, can decrease the likelihood of 
firm default. Future research should evaluate other possible market designs that can be used to 
lower the likelihood of default and avoid its associated costs. 
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Table 1 
Variable definitions. 
 
Variable Definition 
Effective Spread Annual relative effective spread. Relative effective spread is twice the difference 
between the execution price and the midpoint of the prevailing best bid-ask quote 
divided by the midpoint of the prevailing best bid-ask quote, multiplied by one 
hundred,  and measured over one year. 
Quoted Spread Annual relative quoted spread multiplied by one hundred. Relative quoted spread is the 
best bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the best bid-ask quote. Measured over 
one year. 
Amihud Annual Amihud measure. Annual average of the daily ratio of absolute value of stock 
return divided by dollar trading volume, multiplied by one million.  
Zeros Proportion of days with zero returns, multiplied by one hundred. Measured over one 
year. 
DD Distance-to-default, calculated following Merton (1974) and Bharath and Shumway 
(2008). 
EDF Expected default frequency, computed as N(-DD), where N(.) is the cumulative 
standard normal distribution function. 
Equity Market value of equity (in millions of dollars) calculated as the product of the number 
of shares outstanding and stock price at the end of the year. 
Debt Face value of debt, in millions of dollars, computed as the sum of debt in current 
liabilities (Compustat quarterly data #45) and one-half of long-term debt (Compustat 
quarterly data #51). 
Excess Return Annual excess return, calculated as the difference between firm stock return and 
market return over the same period. 
σE Annualized stock return volatility computed as the standard deviation of stock monthly 
returns over the prior year. 
Income /Assets Ratio of net income (Compustat quarterly data #69) to total asset (Compustat quarterly 
data #44). 
Correlation Absolute value of the correlation between contemporaneous weekly stock returns and 
the one-week lagged weekly stock returns. 
Price Delay 1-(R-squared of restricted model / R-squared of nonrestricted model). The 
nonrestricted model is specified as 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
(−𝑛)
𝑅𝑚,𝑡−𝑛
4
𝑛=1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡, where ri,t 
is the return on stock i in week t, Rm,t is the return on Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) value-weighted market index in week t. The restricted model constrains 
that δ(-n) =0. 
Price Impact Price impact component of the relative effective spread. It is measured as Price Impactit 
= 100× LRit (Pit+n − Mit) /Mit, where Pit+n denotes the first trade price observed at least 
30 minutes after the trade for which price impact is measured, Mit is the midpoint of 
the matched prevailing best bid-ask quote, and LRit is an indicator variable that equals 
one for buyer-initiated trade and negative one for seller-initiated trade. 
Block Aggregate percentage ownership of blockholders who hold at least 5% of total common 
shares outstanding at the end of the year. 
NBlock Number of block owners who hold at least 5% of total common shares outstanding at 
the end of the year. 
Tobin’s q  Market value of assets over book value of assets calculated from Compustat: (ATQ –
CEQQ + CSHOQ × PRCCQ) / ATQ where ATQ is total asset (Compustat quarterly data 
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#44), CEQQ is total common equity (Compustat quarterly data #59), CSHOQ is 
common shares outstanding (Compustat quarterly data #61), and PRCCQ is stock price 
at the end of the quarter. 
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Table 2  
Summary statistics. 
The table reports summary statistics for the sample firm-year observations. The variables are defined 
in Table 1. Panel A contains 51,527 firm-year observations between 1993 and 2013. The sample period for 
DD and EDF is 1994-2014. Panel B contains 5,428 firm-year observations for the decimalization sample, 
in 2000 and 2002. The descriptive statistics are the mean, minimum, median, maximum, and standard 
deviation of the key variables.  
 
Variable N Mean Minimum Median Maximum Standard deviation 
Panel A: Full sample variables 
Effective Spread 51,527 0.9961 0.0262 0.4996 6.7551 1.2330 
Quoted Spread 51,527 1.2059 0.0336 0.6899 5.2183 1.2842 
Amihud 51,527 0.4154 0.0000 0.0129 10.2386 1.4088 
Zeros 51,527 6.8188 0.0000 3.9683 33.3333 7.4337 
DD 51,527 7.3415 -1.9667 6.0064 30.5048 6.1772 
EDF 51,527 0.0619 0.0000 0. 0000 1.0000 0.1886 
Equity 51,527 3,111.22 22.92 509.42 62,816.52 8,672.40 
Debt 51,527 515.31 0.03 68.64 8,865.50 1,333.55 
Excess Return 51,527 0.0543 -0.9687 -0.0476 3.3550 0.6659 
σE 51,527 0.5112 0.1116 0.4212 1.9445 0.3350 
Income/Assets 51,527 -0.0076 -0.3197 0.0081 0.0885 0.0603 
 
Panel B: Decimalization period variables 
Correlation 5,795 0.1296 0.0013 0.1121 0.4239 0.0964 
Price Delay 5,795 0.4849 0.0222 0.4468 0.9992 0.3005 
Block 5,795 0.1487 0 0.1224 0.8754 0.1400 
NBlock 5,795 1.6835 0 1 9 1.4810 
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Table 3  
Distribution of expected default frequency (EDF) by liquidity groups. 
The table reports the distribution of EDF across five groups of stocks formed on liquidity measures 
during the sample period from 1994 to 2014. For each year, stocks are assigned into one of the five groups 
based on their liquidity measure. Group 1 consists of stocks with the highest liquidity, and stocks in group 
5 are the least liquid. For each group, we report the average EDF. The liquidity measures are Effective 
Spread, Quoted Spread, Amihud, and Zeros. Table 1 defines the variables. The 5-1 row reports the average 
EDF difference between the least liquid and most liquid stocks. Below in parentheses is the t-statistic. *, **, 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 EDF 
Liquidity measures 
Effective Spread 
(1) 
Quoted Spread 
(2) 
Amihud 
(3) 
Zeros 
(4) 
1 (most liquid) 0.0098 0.0107 0.0148 0.0206 
2 0.0268 0.0260 0.0286 0.0301 
3 0.0486 0.0489 0.0491 0.0473 
4 0.0751 0.0746 0.0768 0.0721 
5 (least liquid) 0.1207 0.1209 0.1114 0.1126 
     
5- 1 0.1109*** 0.1102*** 0.0966*** 0.0921*** 
t-statistic (6.30) (6.43) (6.03) (5.62) 
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Table 4  
Regressions of default risk on stock liquidity. 
The table presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of default risk on liquidity measures. 
There are 51,527 firm-year observations between 1994 and 2014. The dependent variable is the expected 
default frequency (EDF). Panel A reports the overall results. Column 1 presents the results of the 
regression without a liquidity measure. Columns 2 to 5 report the results of regressions with Effective 
Spread, Quoted Spread, Amihud, and Zeros as liquidity measures, respectively. Other control variables 
are Ln(Equity), Ln(Debt), 1/σE , Excess Return, and Income/Assets. We control for both firm and year 
fixed effects in all regressions. Panel B reports the coefficients for the four liquidity measures from OLS 
regressions with EDF as the dependent variable for each of the Fama and French 12 industries. We 
control for both firm and year fixed effects in all regressions. See Table 1 for definitions of all variables. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and are presented in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: OLS specifications 
 Dependent variable: EDFt 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Effective Spread-1 
 
0.0135*** 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.0011) 
 
 
 Quoted Spread t-1  0.0243***  
   (0.0019)   
Amihud t-1    0.0072***  
    (0.0010)  
Zeros t-1 
   
 0.0016*** 
 
   
 (0.0003) 
Ln(Equity) t-1 -0.0279*** -0.0236*** -0.0162*** -0.0259*** -0.0240*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) 
Ln(Debt) t-1 0.0104*** 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0105*** 0.0101*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
1/σE t-1 -0.0138*** -0.0138*** -0.0138*** -0.0139*** -0.0146*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Excess Return t-1 -0.0613*** -0.0619*** -0.0635*** -0.0622*** -0.0617*** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Income/Assets t-1 -0.1597*** -0.1560*** -0.1481*** -0.1596*** -0.1561*** 
 
(0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0266) (0.0265) (0.0266) 
Intercept 0.1910*** 0.1507*** 0.0820*** 0.1775*** 0.1456*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0118) (0.0134) (0.0115) (0.0136) 
      
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Number of observations 51,527 51,527 51,527 51,527 51,527 
Adjusted R2 0.1680 0.1739 0.1771 0.1706 0.1693 
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Table 4 Continued 
Panel B: Within-industry regressions 
 
Industry name Description 
Effective 
Spread 
Quoted 
Spread Amihud Zeros N 
Nondurables Food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather, 
toys 
0.0150*** 0.0273*** 0.0029 0.0003 3,412 
 
(0.0048) (0.0071) (0.0030) (0.0011) 
 Durables Cars, TVs, furniture, household 
appliances 
0.0117** 0.0292** 0.0010 0.0020 1,569 
 
(0.0047) (0.0122) (0.0055) (0.0013) 
 Manufacturing Machinery, trucks, planes, office 
furniture, paper, commercial printing 
0.0167*** 0.0416*** 0.0131*** 0.0022*** 7,024 
 
(0.0030) (0.0056) (0.0032) (0.0008) 
 Energy Oil, gas, and coal extraction and products 0.0082** 0.0166* 0.0037 0.0004 2,650 
 
(0.0036) (0.0095) (0.0062) (0.0011) 
 Chemicals Chemicals and allied products 0.0108** 0.0235* 0.0030 -0.0003 1,546 
 
(0.0049) (0.0127) (0.0055) (0.0018) 
 
Business equipment 
Computers, software, and electronic 
equipment 
0.0121*** 0.0200*** 0.0063*** 0.0017*** 9,578 
(0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0006) 
 Telecommunications Telephone and television transmission 0.0197** 0.0315*** 0.0139* -0.0001 2,143 
 
(0.0081) (0.0117) (0.0071) (0.0021) 
 Utilities Utilities 0.0037 0.0349** 0.0075 -0.0003 2,511 
 
(0.0040) (0.0157) (0.0079) (0.0005) 
 Shops Wholesale, retail, and some services 
(laundries, repair shops) 
0.0140*** 0.0288*** 0.0082** 0.0032*** 6,792 
 
(0.0029) (0.0053) (0.0032) (0.0009) 
 Health Health care, medical equipment, and 
drugs 
0.0140*** 0.0175*** 0.0051** 0.0014** 5,977 
 
(0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0020) (0.0007) 
 Other Mines, construction, building materials, 
transportation, hotels, business services, 
entertainment 
0.0155*** 0.0216*** 0.0050** 0.0022*** 8,325 
 
(0.0028) (0.0048) (0.0024) (0.0008)  
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Table 5  
Difference-in-differences analysis of the effect of stock liquidity on default risk. 
The table presents a difference-in-differences analysis of stock liquidity on default risk surrounding the 
decimalization year. Panel A, Column 1, reports the results of a probit model based on the pre-matched 
firms in the treatment and the control groups. The dependent variable of the probit model equals one if 
the firm belongs to the treatment group and zero if the firm comes from the control group. The 
independent variables of the probit model are the control variables used in the expected default frequency 
(EDF) regression measured in the pre-decimalization year. Panel A, Column 2, reports the results of the 
same probit model based on the post-matched firms in the treatment and the control groups. Panel B 
reports statistical distributions of the propensity scores of the treatment and control groups and their 
differences.  Panel C reports pre-decimalization variable averages for the treatment and control groups, 
the differences in means of each variable, and the corresponding t-statistics. Panel D reports post-
decimalization variable averages for the treatment and control groups, the differences in means of each 
variable, and the corresponding t-statistics. Panel E reports the difference-in-differences estimator based 
on the matched sample. Panel F reports the results for the difference-in-differences regression based on 
the matched sample. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to one if a stock is in the treatment group and 
zero if in the control group. After is a dummy variable equal to one for 2002 (post-decimalization year) 
and zero for 2000. Treatment*After is the interaction between these two variables. See Table 1 for 
variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered by firm and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel B: Propensity scores distribution 
 
Group N Mean Minimum Median Maximum Standard deviation 
Treatment 700 0.5604 0.1043 0.4296 0.5409 0.6865 
Control 700 0.5605 0.1060 0.4296 0.5407 0.6885 
Difference 700 0.0000 -0.0092 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 
 
 
 
Panel A: Probit regressions with pre- and post-matched samples 
Variable 
Pre-match 
(1) 
Post-match 
(2) 
Effective Spread 0.3945*** 0.0234 
 
(0.0569) (0.0617) 
Ln(Equity)  -0.0209 0.0461 
 (0.0420) (0.0543) 
Ln(Debt)  0.0340** -0.0215 
 (0.0168) (0.0245) 
1/σE  0.1062*** -0.0132 
 (0.0388) (0.0583) 
Excess Return  0.3253*** -0.0164 
 (0.0506) (0.0703) 
Income/Assets  2.6684*** 0.0814 
 (0.6575) (0.9641) 
Intercept -0.7370** -0.1941 
 
(0.3082) (0.3739) 
   
Number of observations 1,432 1,400 
p-value of χ2  0.0000 0.9556 
Pseudo R2  0.1068 0.0016 
Log likelihood -886.5668 -968.8584 
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Table 5 Continued  
 
Panel C: Differences in variables in pre-decimalization year 
 
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-statistic p-value 
Effective Spread 1.6429 1.6124 0.0305 0.46 0.6478 
Ln(Equity) 5.6413 5.6071 0.0342 0.47 0.6350 
Ln(Debt) 3.3766 3.4991 -0.1225 -0.97 0.3303 
1/σE 1.8663 1.9106 -0.0443 -0.84 0.4023 
Excess Return 0.2379 0.2421 -0.0042 -0.10 0.9237 
Income/Assets -0.001 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.16 0.8724 
Tobin’s q 2.0933 1.9552 0.1381 1.35 0.1758 
 
Panel D: Differences in variables in post-decimalization year 
 
Variable Treatment Control Difference t-statistic p-value 
Effective Spread 0.8239 4.1281 -3.3042 -35.64 <0.0001 
Ln(Equity) 5.8113 5.5487 0.2626 3.87 0.0001 
Ln(Debt) 3.3182 3.4938 -0.1755 -1.38 0.1687 
1/σE 2.3195 2.2219 0.0977 1.55 0.1221 
Excess Return 0.1968 -0.0241 0.2209 9.22 <0.0001 
Income/Assets 0.0019 -0.00971 0.0116 4.43 <0.0001 
Tobin’s q 1.7916 1.6674 0.1242 1.72 0.0859 
 
Panel E: Difference-in-differences estimator 
 
Variable 
Treatment  Control 
Difference-in-differences  t-statistic p-value 
Before  After   Before  After  
EDF 0.0889 0.0215  0.1113 0.1336 -0.0897 -6.69 <0.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 Continued 
 
Panel F: Difference-in-differences regression 
 
 Dependent variable: EDF t 
Variable (1) (2) 
Treatment*After -0.0616*** -0.0624*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0224) 
Treatment -0.0195 -0.0248 
 (0.0182) (0.0177) 
After 0.0258 0.0265 
 
(0.0213) (0.0212) 
Ln(Equity) t -0.0400*** -0.0392*** 
 
(0.0065) (0.0063) 
Ln(Debt) t 0.0335*** 0.0299*** 
 
(0.0034) (0.0031) 
1/σE t -0.0549*** -0.0562*** 
 
(0.0057) (0.0059) 
Excess Return t -0.0392*** -0.0409*** 
 
(0.0105) (0.0113) 
Income/Assets t -0.0456 -0.0366 
 
(0.1015) (0.1007) 
∆Tobin’s q*After -0.0018 -0.0038 
 (0.0062) (0.0063) 
Intercept 0.3328*** 0.3462*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0400) 
   
Industry fixed effects No Yes 
   
Number of observations 2,800 2,800 
Adjusted R2  0.2201 0.2120 
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Table 6  
Difference-in-differences regressions of default risk on liquidity, by expected default frequency (EDF) 
quartiles. 
This table reports the results for the difference-in-differences regressions of the four groups formed 
according to the size of the EDF in 2000 (pre-decimalization year). This test is based on the matched 
sample constructed in Table 5. Column 1 consists of firms with the highest EDF in 2000. Column 4 has 
firms with the lowest EDF in 2000. Treatment is a dummy variable equal to one if a stock is in the 
treatment group and zero if in the control group. After is a dummy variable equal to one for 2002 (post-
decimalization year) and zero for 2000. Treatment*After is the interaction between these two variables. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Variable 
Highest EDF t 
(1) 
Second EDF t 
(2) 
Third EDF t 
(3) 
Lowest EDF t 
(4) 
Treatment*After -0.1464** -0.0976*** -0.0539*** -0.0345** 
 (0.0660) (0.0263) (0.0190) (0.0152) 
Treatment -0.0127 -0.0031 -0.0065 0.0000 
 (0.0426) (0.0107) (0.0050) (0.0030) 
After -0.1002 0.1297*** 0.0838*** 0.0352*** 
 
(0.0629) (0.0277) (0.0241) (0.0133) 
Ln(Equity) t -0.0651*** -0.0106 -0.0135** -0.0012 
 
(0.0189) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0030) 
Ln(Debt) t 0.0410*** 0.0124** 0.0097** 0.0016 
 
(0.0109) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0020) 
1/σE t -0.1065*** -0.0385*** -0.0266*** -0.0082** 
 
(0.0219) (0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0035) 
Excess Return t -0.0619** -0.0141 -0.0043 -0.0013 
 
(0.0261) (0.0112) (0.0085) (0.0035) 
Income/Assets t 0.0193 -0.0158 -0.1161 -0.1992** 
 
(0.2986) (0.1277) (0.1042) (0.0839) 
∆Tobin’s q*After -0.0307** -0.0265 0.0063 -0.0089 
 (0.0147) (0.0236) (0.0061) (0.0080) 
Intercept 0.7208*** 0.0961** 0.1034*** 0.0221 
 (0.0772) (0.0381) (0.0304) (0.0172) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of observations 700 696 706 698 
Adjusted R2  0.2928 0.2243 0.1660 0.1137 
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Table 7  
Analysis of the firm value effect. 
This table reports the results of subsample analysis based on each expected default frequency (EDF) 
component. This test is based on the matched sample constructed in Table 5. Column 1 includes only the 
matched sample of stocks with zero or negative change of Ln(Equity). In Column 2 the sample includes 
only firms with positive change of Ln(Equity). Column 3 evaluates stock with zero or positive change of 
Ln(Debt), Column 4 includes firms with negative change of Ln(Debt). Treatment is a dummy variable 
equal to one if a stock is in the treatment group and zero if in the control group. After is a dummy variable 
equal to one for 2002 (post-decimalization year) and zero for 2000. Treatment*After is the interaction 
term between these two variables. Z-statistics are used to assess the significance of the difference between 
the coefficients on Treatment*After in the two subsamples. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: EDF t 
 
 
Variable 
∆Ln(Equity) 
<0 
(1) 
∆Ln(Equity) 
>0 
(2) 
∆Ln(Debt) 
>0 
(3) 
∆Ln(Debt) 
<0 
(4) 
Treatment*After -0.1161*** 0.0141 -0.1115*** -0.0007 
 (0.0321) (0.0314) (0.0300) (0.0318) 
Treatment -0.0080 -0.0210 -0.0189 -0.0224 
 (0.0235) (0.0289) (0.0217) (0.0270) 
After 0.0598** -0.0561** 0.0688** -0.0340 
 
(0.0274) (0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0311) 
Ln(Equity) t -0.0469*** -0.0292*** -0.0325*** -0.0453*** 
 
(0.0091) (0.0055) (0.0078) (0.0097) 
Ln(Debt) t 0.0369*** 0.0223*** 0.0293*** 0.0296*** 
 
(0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0039) 
1/σE t -0.0801*** -0.0223*** -0.0695*** -0.0277*** 
 
(0.0099) (0.0044) (0.0086) (0.0061) 
Excess Return t -0.0400** -0.0369*** -0.0430** -0.0292** 
 
(0.0157) (0.0109) (0.0172) (0.0122) 
Income/Assets t 0.1658 -0.1656 0.0754 -0.2650 
 
(0.1376) (0.1225) (0.1191) (0.1677) 
∆Tobin’s q*After -0.0078 0.0113** -0.0022 -0.0051 
 (0.0091) (0.0052) (0.0106) (0.0032) 
Intercept 0.4116*** 0.2346*** 0.3321*** 0.3195*** 
 (0.0571) (0.0405) (0.0488) (0.0583) 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,442 1,358 1,504 1,296 
Adjusted R2  0.2344 0.1726 0.2155 0.2085 
   
Z-statistics 2.8995*** 2.5344*** 
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Table 8  
Informational efficiency mechanism. 
Panel A presents a difference-in-differences test on how changes in Effective Spread surrounding the 
decimalization year affect the informational efficiency of stock price. Correlation is the absolute value of 
the correlation between contemporaneous weekly stock returns and the one-week lagged weekly stock 
returns. Price Delay is 1-(R-squared of restricted model / R-square of nonrestricted model). The 
difference-in-differences estimators are computed by subtracting the ∆Correlation (∆Price Delay) of the 
control firms from those of the treatment firms. The difference-in-differences test is based on the matched 
sample used in Table 5. Panel B reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results with ΔEDF as the 
dependent variable based on the matched sample constructed in Table 5. Δ presents the change of 
variables from 2000 (prior to decimalization) to 2002 (after decimalization). Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-differences estimator 
Variable 
Treatment  Control Difference-in-
differences  
t-statistic p-value 
Before  After   Before  After  
Correlation 0.1377 0.1183  0.1338 0.1436 -0.0292 -3.78 0.0002 
Price Delay 0.5929 0.4217  0.5812 0.4726 -0.0625 -3.15 0.0017 
 
Panel B: OLS regression surrounding the decimalization 
 
 Dependent variable: ΔEDF 
Variable (1) (2) 
ΔCorrelation 0.2088***  
 
(0.0555)  
ΔPrice Delay 
 
0.0838*** 
 
 
(0.0208) 
ΔLn(Equity) -0.1011*** -0.0983*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0179) 
ΔLn(Debt) 0.0065 0.0059 
 (0.0043) (0.0041) 
Δ(1/σE) -0.0284*** -0.0192*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0058) 
ΔExcess Return -0.0254*** -0.0263*** 
 
(0.0092) (0.0091) 
ΔIncome/Assets -0.1464 -0.1364 
 (0.1483) (0.1469) 
∆Tobin’s q 0.0089 0.0102* 
 (0.0065) (0.0062) 
Intercept -0.0066 0.0007 
 (0.0087) (0.0092) 
   
Number of observations 1,400 1,400 
Adjusted R2 0.0831 0.0846 
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Table 9 
Corporate governance mechanism. 
Panel A presents a difference-in-differences test on how changes in Effective Spread surrounding the 
decimalization year affect the blockholder ownership and the number of blockholders. Blockholder 
ownership (Block) is calculated by aggregating institutional blockholders percentage, which is above 5% of 
total common shares outstanding at the end of the year. The number of blockholders (NBlock) is the 
number of block owners who hold at least 5% of total common shares outstanding at the end of the year. 
The difference-in-differences test is based on the matched sample used in Table 5. Panel B reports the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results with ΔEDF as the dependent variable based on the 
matched sample constructed in Table 5. Δ presents the change of variables from 2000 (prior to 
decimalization) to 2002 (after decimalization). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Panels C and D repeat the 
analysis by replacing Effective Spread with Price Impact (see Table 1 for definitions of Price Impact). 
 
Panel A: Difference-in-difference estimator—Effective Spread 
 
Variable 
Treatment  Control Difference-in-
differences  
t-statistic p-value 
Before  After   Before  After  
Block 0.1656 0.1793  0.1603 0.1426 0.0314 4.94 <0.0001 
NBlock 1.8800 2.0857  1.8000 1.6657 0.3400 4.76 <0.0001 
 
Panel B: OLS regression surrounding the decimalization—Effective Spread 
 
 Dependent variable: ΔEDF 
Variable (1) (2) 
ΔBlock -0.1617***  
 
(0.0547)  
ΔNBlock  -0.0079* 
  (0.0046) 
ΔLn(Equity) -0.1080*** -0.1063*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0186) 
ΔLn(Debt) 0.0060 0.0065 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Δ(1/σE) -0.0249*** -0.0251*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0058) 
ΔExcess Return -0.0250*** -0.0251*** 
 (0.0092) (0.0092) 
ΔIncome/Assets -0.1715 -0.1570 
 (0.1467) (0.1461) 
∆Tobin’s q 0.0095 0.0100 
 (0.0063) (0.0064) 
Intercept -0.0087 -0.0080 
 (0.0087) (0.0088) 
   
Number of observations 1,400 1,400 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.0760 0.0725 
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Table 9 Continued 
 
Panel C: Difference-in-difference estimator—Price Impact 
 
Variable 
Treatment  Control Difference-in-
differences  
t-statistic p-value 
Before  After   Before  After  
Block 0.1679 0.1787  0.1752 0.1754 0.0107 1.67 0.0963 
NBlock 1.9218 2.0936  2.0184 2.0291 0.1610 2.11 0.0351 
 
Panel D: OLS regression surrounding the decimalization—Price Impact 
 
 Dependent variable: ΔEDF 
Variable (1) (2) 
ΔBlock -0.2303***  
 
(0.0629)  
ΔNBlock  -0.0171*** 
  (0.0049) 
ΔLn(Equity) -0.1129*** -0.1104*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0171) 
ΔLn(Debt) 0.0071* 0.0073* 
 (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Δ(1/σE) -0.0246*** -0.0245*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0056) 
ΔExcess Return -0.0443*** -0.0443*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0088) 
ΔIncome/Assets -0.1525 -0.1571 
 (0.1143) (0.1137) 
∆Tobin’s q 0.0174** 0.0174** 
 (0.0068) (0.0068) 
Intercept 0.0162* 0.0164* 
 (0.0089) (0.0089) 
   
Number of observations 1,304 1,304 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.1262 0.1242 
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Table 10  
Relative importance of mechanisms. 
This table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions results with ΔEDF STD as the 
dependent variable based on the matched sample constructed in Table 5. Δ presents the change of 
variables from 2000 (prior to decimalization) to 2002 (after decimalization). ΔEDF is standardized by 
subtracting its mean value and dividing the difference by the standard deviation of ΔEDF. Similarly, all 
the independent variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 Dependent variable: ∆EDF STD 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
∆Correlation STD 0.1054*** 0.1084***   
 (0.0291) (0.0295)   
∆Price Delay STD 
  
0.1220*** 0.1208*** 
 
  
(0.0298) (0.0298) 
∆Block STD -0.0626*** 
 
-0.0757***  
 
(0.0238) 
 
(0.0244)  
∆NBlock STD 
 
-0.0307  -0.0430* 
 
 
(0.0235)  (0.0232) 
∆Ln(Equity) STD -0.2260*** -0.2223*** -0.2205*** -0.2168*** 
 
(0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0389) (0.0390) 
∆Ln(Debt) STD 0.0214 0.0232 0.0183 0.0203 
 (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0158) (0.0158) 
∆(1/σE) STD -0.1166*** -0.1175*** -0.0797*** -0.0809*** 
 (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0240) (0.0240) 
ΔExcess Return STD -0.0919*** -0.0921*** -0.0952*** -0.0955*** 
 (0.0329) (0.0330) (0.0327) (0.0328) 
∆Income/Assets STD -0.0307 -0.0282 -0.0302 -0.0276 
 (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0252) (0.0251) 
∆Tobin’s q STD 0.0417 0.0437 0.0474 0.0499 
 (0.0326) (0.0328) (0.0311) (0.0314) 
Intercept 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0255) (0.0256) 
     
Number of observations 1,400 1,400 1,400 1,400 
Adjusted R2  0.0862 0.0833 0.0895 0.0858 
     
 
 
 
